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In 1824, Lady Mary Shepherd published a pamphlet on Hume: An Essay
upon the Relation of Cause and Effect; controverting the Doctrine of Mr Hume,
concerning the Nature of that Relation; with Observations upon the Opinions of
Dr Brown and Mr Lawrence connected with the Same Subject 1. Not very much
is known of Shepherd’s life: she was born in 1777 near Edinburgh and she
married Henry John Shepherd, son of an influential lawyer. She spent her life
in Edinburgh and London, where she died in 18472. She wrote about philos-
ophy mostly between 1824 and 1832, also publishing a collection of essays on
Berkeley and a reply to John Fearn on the extension of the soul3. Shepherd
received no formal education, but was privately taught at home. Her insight-
ful knowledge derived from the lively Edinburgh intellectual milieu: though
not attending university classes, the Edinburgh audience could be informed
about the academic debates regarding mathematics, natural philosophy,
gnoseology, and economics through a number of public lectures, scientific
demonstrations, and essays which appeared in the Edinburgh newspapers.
The popularisation of science was strongly felt in Edinburgh, as confirmed by
the efforts to build a public observatory and the close collaboration of aca-
demics such as Dugald Stewart, John Playfair, and Thomas Brown with the
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1 M. SHEPHERD, An Essay upon the Relation of Cause and Effect; controverting the Doctrine of 
Mr Hume, concerning the Nature of that Relation; with Observations upon the Opinions of Dr Brown and
Mr Lawrence connected with the Same Subject, London, Hookman, 1824.
2 For Shepherd’s life, see the homonymous entry in the Oxford Dictionary of National
Biography, edited by M.A. Perkins. 
3 M. SHEPHERD, Essays on the Perception of an External Universe, and Other Subjects connected
with the Doctrine of Causation, London, Hatchard, 1827 and Lady Mary Shepherd’s Metaphysics, “Frazer’s
Magazine for Town and Country”, 30, 1832, pp. 697-708.
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popular press and the Encyclopaedia Britannica4. Moreover, the Shepherds’
salon gathered important figures, such as Walter Scott and Charles Babbage;
through them, she would certainly have been introduced to scientific and
philosophical issues. 
Shepherd’s primary philosophical concern was causality: even when
dealing with Berkeley’s account of perception or facing the issue of the mate-
riality of the soul, she discussed these in causal terms, understanding our
perceptions as the effects of material objects5. The central role played by
causality in Shepherd’s philosophy can be placed within the context of two
notorious controversies which flourished in Britain at the beginning of the
nineteenth century. 
Firstly, Shepherd’s ideas were stimulated by the debate that arouse out of
the Leslie affair: in 1805, John Leslie, candidate to the chair of mathematics
at Edinburgh, was charged with atheism for quoting Hume in a footnote in
his book on heat6. The Leslie affair revitalised the debate on Hume and
Humean causality. Dugald Stewart, who officially defended Leslie, appealed
to Thomas Reid’s reading of Hume: Hume was substantially correct in
describing physical causality as a temporal connection; he was wrong in
extending it to moral actions. According to Stewart, Hume’s account of
causality is therefore harmless if limited to natural philosophy and presents
an accurate definition of causality as a constant succession of events7. 
Thomas Brown, who also supported Leslie, was more radical and
affirmed that the Humean definition of cause should be extended to morals
and that we have no distinct idea of power. Thus, efficient action is just a fla-
tus vocis, words with no precise meaning, and cause can only be a synonym
of invariable temporal connection8. 
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4 On the popularisation of science in Edinburgh see especially R. YEO, Encyclopaedic Visions.
Scientific Dictionaries and Enlightenment Culture, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001 and
S. TROPEA, Scienza e divulgazione a Edimburgo all’inizio dell’Ottocento, in Scienza, filosofia, politica nel
Settecento britannico, ed. by L. Turco, Padova, Il Poligrafo, 2003, pp. 441-457. 
5 The close connection between the discussion of causality and demonstration of the existence
of the external world is stressed in M. ATHERTON, Lady Mary Shepherd’s Case against George Berkeley,
“British Journal for the History of Philosophy”, 2, 1996, pp. 347-366.
6 The Leslie affair is discussed by J.B. MORRELL, The University of Edinburgh in the Late
Eighteenth Century: Its Scientific Eminence and Academic Structure, “Isis”, 62, 1971, pp. 158-171 and 
J.P. WRIGHT, The Scientific Reception of Hume’s Theory of Causation: Establishing the Positivist Interpretation
in Early Nineteenth-Century Scotland, in The Reception of David Hume in Europe, ed. by P. Jones, London,
Thoemmes Continuum, pp. 327-347.
7 D. STEWART, A Short Statement of Some Important Facts, relative to the Late Election of a
Mathematical Professor in the University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, Creech, 1805.
8 T. BROWN, Observations on the Nature and Tendency of the Doctrine of Mr Hume, Edinburgh,
Mundell, 1805 (second edition enlarged, Edinburgh, Mundell, 1806; the third edition, further enlarged,
was published with the title Inquiry into the Relation of Cause and Effect, Edinburgh, Constable, 1818).
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The Leslie affair concluded with Leslie’s successful appointment to the
chair of mathematics, a polemic on the Kirk’s influence on the university
administration, three editions of Brown’s essay on causality, several articles
appearing in the Edinburgh newspapers and various essays written by prom-
ising young readers, such as James Mill and Thomas Chalmers9. 
A serious setback for the moderate wing of the Kirk, which failed to
appoint their favoured candidate, the Leslie affair was no minor or parochial
episode. The notorious London physician Thomas Lawrence quoted Brown’s
interpretation of Hume in a note in his Lectures on Physiology published in
1819. Lawrence was engaged in a polemic on the principle of life and quoted
Brown in order to ground medical theories in observable facts, rather than in
seductive systems or unverified hypothesis. In spite of this reasonable
methodological advice, Lawrence quoted Brown in order to maintain that
vital functions are the effect of bodily structure, and also to support a mate-
rialistic view of medicine: 
The powers of sensation and contraction, and the properties of the capillary vessels,
belong peculiarly and exclusively to living organic textures: they are eminently vital,
and form the distinguishing character of living beings. We learn them by observa-
tion, as we learn the properties of dead matter; and we know nothing more than the
fact, that certain vital manifestations are connected with certain organic structures.
The only reason we have for asserting in any case that any property belongs to any
substance, is the certainty or universality with which we find the substance and the
property in question accompanying each other.10
Lawrence aimed to demonstrate that life is the sum of the actions of liv-
ing bodies and tried to exclude any unobservable element from his medical
theory. He was clearly committed to excluding the soul as cause of life, and
Brown’s relational definition of cause seemed to support the assumption that
life can be explained by vital functions without recourse to an efficient power.
Lawrence’s ideas were popular in London intellectual circles from the
beginning of the century and also inspired Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein. They
received their ultimate condemnation in 1819, when the Quarterly Review
included them within the “radical science”, those supposedly scientific dis-
coveries which aimed to subvert any moral and social order11. 
9 T. CHALMERS, Observations on a Passage in Mr Playfair’s Letter to the Lord Provost of Edinburgh,
relative to the Mathematical Pretensions of the Scottish Clergy, Cupar, Tullis, 1805 and J. MILL, Enquiry
respecting the Relation of Cause and Effect, Edinburgh, Ballantyne, 1819. 
10 T. LAWRENCE, Lectures on Physiology, London, Callow, 1819, pp. 78-80.
11 On Frankenstein’s scientific background and its political interpretations see M. BUTLER, The
Quarterly Review and Radical Science, in M. SHELLEY, Frankenstein, or the Modern Prometheus: the 1818
Text, ed. by M. Butler, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998, pp. 229-250. 
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It is not surprising that Shepherd was interested in Hume’s theory of
causality: Lawrence’s appeal to Brown and Brown’s interpretation of Hume
placed Hume at the origin of a chain of thinkers who endeavoured to sup-
port materialism, atheism, and revolution with metaphysical arguments.
Although atheism and infidelity was a common charge, Shepherd did not
tackle the Humean explanation of the belief in miracles or the problem of the
first cause. Her strategy was to put forward a strict metaphysical reasoning 
– rather than appealing to religion – and turned to Hume’s epistemology.
1. Reason and causality
Against Hume, Shepherd intended to prove the following six points: 
FIRST, That reason, not fancy and “custom” leads us to the knowledge, That every
thing which begins to exist must have a Cause. 
SECONDLY, That reason forces the mind to perceive, that similar causes must nec-
essarily produce similar effects. 
THIRDLY, I shall thence establish a more philosophical definition of the relation of
Cause and Effect.
FOURTHLY, show, in what respects Mr. Hume’s definition is faulty. 
FIFTHLY, proceed to prove that Nature cannot be supposed to alter her Course with-
out a contradiction in terms; 
and, finally, show, that Custom and Habit alone are not our guides; but chiefly rea-
son, for the regulation of our expectations in ordinary life.12
The emphasis on the role of reason in the definition of causality is 
striking. Shepherd was implicitly criticising the common-sense philosophers
Thomas Reid and Dugald Stewart for their stressing the intuitive and imme-
diate understanding of causality. Shepherd rather aimed to demonstrate that
causality has a thoroughly rational explanation and she reacted against
Hume’s denial of the possibility that reason could account for causal rela-
tionships.
The key step of her demonstration is perhaps the second point, “that rea-
son forces the mind to perceive, that similar causes must necessarily produce
similar effects”. In the Treatise, Hume notably refuted that reason might
prove that future events will resemble past ones. As causality describes the
course of past events only, reason is unfit to make predictions: the uniform
course of nature is as probable as any of its variations, if custom and belief are
not considered. On the contrary, Shepherd’s own definition of cause is a sort
of causal realism: causes are natural powers whose existence and action are
discovered by reason.
12 SHEPHERD, An Essay upon the Relation of Cause and Effect, pp. 27-28.
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A cause, therefore, is such action of an object, as shall enable it, in conjunction with
another, to form a new nature, capable of exhibiting qualities varying from those of
either of the objects unconjoined. This is really to be a producer of new being.13
Unlike Reid and Stewart, Lady Shepherd maintained that effects depend
on causes, that is that physical causes are powers and not merely the tempo-
ral antecedents of their effects. She was aware that we can seldom explain how
causes produce effects or what causes are, but this is not important for scien-
tific enquiry, as similar effects must be produced by similar qualities: 
it is immaterial to the definition of the relation of Cause and Effect, that we are not
acquainted with the “secret powers” of natural objects, either before or after experi-
ence; for when we find, that in any distinct and given circumstances they put on
certain qualities to the senses, their secret powers and properties must be qualified
in all like circumstances to be the same, and are obliged to be so.14
Mary Shepherd thought of the physical world in a truly deterministic
framework, in which a particular event can result from one and only one
cause, whether simple or complex. Accordingly, the visible effect is the sign
that a corresponding efficient cause has occurred: even though we cannot per-
ceive any productive power with the senses, we can indeed infer its existence
from the appearance of the effect. Shepherd was not afraid of Hume’s scepti-
cal argument according to which a known effect cannot be inferred from an
unknown cause. She was instead eager to insist that, as causality is a necessary
connection, the appearance of the effect cannot but imply that its cause pro-
duced it; the appearance of an altered effect means that a dissimilar cause
occurred. As a matter of fact, Shepherd did not demonstrate that cause and
effect are necessarily connected; she rather took a deterministic view of phys-
ical phenomena for granted, which allows us to affirm that similar events are
produced in similar circumstances and that this is true in past as well as in
future situations. 
In her Introduction to the Philosophical Works of Lady Mary Shepherd,
Jennifer McRobert places Shepherd’s criticism of Hume within the context of
British reactions to Kant in the late eighteenth century. McRobert affirms
that “an interest in Kant, and in Kant’s response to Hume, had immediately
preceded the Leslie affair, and is likely to have shed new and sympathetic light
on Hume and his quest for truth”15. Yet, while in the late eighteenth century
Kant’s philosophy was introduced into Britain by several reviews, essays and
commentaries, it seems unlikely that the critical philosophy lent support to
13 Ivi, p. 65.
14 Ivi, p. 58.
15 J. MCROBERT, Introd. to Philosophical Works of Lady Mary Shepherd, Bristol, Thoemmes,
2000, p. XI.
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Hume’s theory of causality. As Giuseppe Micheli has demonstrated, Kant was
mostly discussed for his political views on the French revolution and for the
consequences of his philosophy on rational theology16, and causality was not
much analysed. Moreover, Hume was not generally supported in the early
nineteenth century: common-sense philosophers and conservative thinkers
charged him with scepticism and atheism, while radicals chose more appeal-
ing sources, such as Hartley’s associationism or Bentham’s utilitarianism.
Thomas Brown, who defended Hume on causality and criticised Kant on the
notion of space, was a quite isolated figure and did not deal with causality in
his review of Kant17.
It should also be noted that Shepherd was reluctant to admit that causal-
ity is a psychological creation, more or less based on experience and reflec-
tion; therefore she seems not to have agreed with Kant on causality as a cat-
egory or lex mentis. Moreover, Kant was mentioned in Stewart’s Dissertation,
where critical philosophy was understood through British eyes and was
deemed as a contribution to the psychological explanation of human knowl-
edge. Stewart compared Kant with Richard Price and Ralph Cudworth reach-
ing the conclusion that while Kant’s appeal to reason 
was new in Germany, it certainly could have no claim to the praise of originality, in
the estimation of those at all acquainted with English literature [...] I do not know,
that, in this anatomy of the mind, much progress has hitherto been made by the
German metaphysicians. A great deal certainly has been accomplished by the late
Dr. Reid; and something, perhaps, has been added to his labours by those of his 
successors.18
Shepherd was probably not very impressed by Stewart’s account of Kant’s
philosophy, since it did not provide a sound alternative to Hume’s scepticism.
Writing about the notion of space, Shepherd affirmed that 
Kant imagines time and space to be only modes of the mind, which is mistaking the
causes which determine a mode of the mind with effect, viz. the mode of the mind.19
16 G. MICHELI, The Early Reception of Kant’s Thought in England 1785 -1805 , London, Routledge-
Thoemmes, 1999.
17 T. BROWN, Viller’s Philosophy of Kant, “Edinburgh Review”, 2, 1803, pp. 253-280. 
18 D. STEWART, Dissertation exhibiting a General View of the Progress of Metaphysical, Ethical, and
Political Philosophy, in The Collected Works of Dugald Stewart, ed. by W. Hamilton, 11 vols, Edinburgh,
Constable, 1854 (reprinted by Gregg International Publisher, 1971), vol. I, pp. 400-401. For Kant’s influ-
ence on Stewart see R. WELLEK, Immanuel Kant in England, London, Routledge, 1999 and J. FRIDAY,
Dugald Stewart on Reid, Kant and the Refutation of Idealism, “British Journal for the History of
Philosophy”, 13, 2005, pp. 263-286.
19 SHEPHERD, That mathematical demonstration and physical induction are founded upon similar
principles of evidence – against Mr. Dugald Stewart, in Essays on the Perception of an External Universe, p. 59.
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For Shepherd, Kant’s definition of space and time as pure mental forms
corresponded to a psychological explanation of sensible experience. Her goal
was conversely to ensure an objective foundation to human knowledge and
to base it on the external world. Therefore, Kant’s subjectivist account of
causality was not of help in her criticism of Hume, as Kant was seen as a sup-
porter of a psychological explanation, while she was trying to restore a realis-
tic account. At the time Shepherd wrote her Essay on causality, Kant’s philos-
ophy was still mostly mediated by its empiricist British interpreters and it
appeared as a reaction against Hume still appealing to human nature. Shepherd,
however, aimed to show that causality is a real connection between events and
felt uncomfortable with any explanations based on mental entities, such as
custom, common-sense, or Kantian categories. 
2. Causality and mathematics 
Like some recent readers of Hume, Shepherd noted that Hume was not
always coherent in defending the regularity view and in fact he employed the
definition of causation as the action of a material power20. Far from suspect-
ing that the common interpretation of Hume – put forward by Reid and
Brown – might not be correct, Shepherd concluded that even Hume could
not rely on the philosophy he had introduced. She explained this apparent
inconsistency by appealing to the principle which even Hume could not
escape, the mathematical axiom 
that where quantities, or diagrams, resemble each other, the relations which are true,
with respect to ONE of each kind will be true with respect to all others of a like kind;
ONLY because there is nothing else to make a difference among them.21
It is somewhat surprising to find that the uniformity of nature is a math-
ematical axiom rather than a principle of natural philosophy (as Newton
defined it). Shepherd thought that confidence in the uniformity of nature is
not an unjustified extension to the future of the laws we have verified in the
past, nor is it the result of a wild analogy, by which uncertain conclusions are
proved through a dubious similarity with known cases. The principle that
similar causes must have similar effects is a variant of the axiom according to
20 Shepherd noted that the regularity view was challenged by Hume himself when writing that
the “secret powers of nature” are conjoined with sensible qualities (D. HUME, Enquiry concerning Human
Understanding, ed. by T.L. Beauchamp, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 114). For similar com-
ments see J.P. WRIGHT, The Sceptical Realism of David Hume, Manchester, Manchester University Press,
1983; G. STRAWSON, The Secret Connexion: Causation, Realism, and David Hume, Oxford, Clarendon
Press, 1989; S. BUCKLE, Hume’s Enlightenment Tract, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001.
21 SHEPHERD, An Essay upon the Relation of Cause and Effect, p. 77.
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which the properties of a diagram can be extended to any other diagram of
the same kind. Therefore, empirical knowledge is not based on analogy, but
on the classification of natural phenomena into genera and the discovery of
the properties of each class; it is obvious – and requires no demonstration –
that all the elements of the class share the same properties. 
Shepherd’s words suggest that she was quite familiar with mathematics
and that she thought that it could successfully be applied to empirical
enquiry. These thoughts were alien to Hume and were instead suggested by
the discussion on induction and mathematics which flourished in Britain in
the early 1820s. As little is known about Shepherd’s education, it is difficult
to assess precisely her familiarity with mathematics. Although there is no
record of the books she had read, it is possible to infer her acquaintance with
mathematics from some published essays. In particular, Shepherd may well be
familiar with the essays of the Scot Matthew Stewart, John Playfair, John
Leslie and John Robison, whose works were also debated outside the
University. Their popularity was mostly due to their political opinions and
interpretations of the connections of science and the French revolution:
Robison was praised among Tories for defending sound British science against
the contamination of the French doctrines. Science was used as an argument
against Revolution and was therefore largely present in the popular press.
Robison himself wrote the scientific entries of the third edition of the
Encyclopaedia Britannica, compiling readable essays and also reporting some
recent discoveries22. Although this scientific discussion was not technical,
Shepherd could have found it attractive for its political value and appealing
due to its connections with sound knowledge and firm evidence. 
In particular, in an essay published in 1827, Shepherd proudly affirmed
that she agreed with the eminent mathematician Laplace in thinking that
Newton’s method for discovering the law of gravity and the method
employed for the binomial theorem were exactly the same23. On the contrary,
Dugald Stewart had lamented that Laplace overlooked that mathematics and
natural philosophy could not be investigated following the same method, as
mathematicians seek universal and necessary truths, while natural philoso-
22 On Robison’s political ideas and his role in the Scottish science see J. MORRELL, Professor
Robison and Playfair, and the Theophobia Gallica. Natural Philosophy, Religion and Politics in Edinburgh
1789 -1815 , “Notes and Records of the Royal Society of London”, 26, 1971, pp. 43-63 and J.L. HEILBRON,
Electricity in the 17th and 18th Centuries, Dover, New York, Dover Publication, 1999, pp. 465-468. 
23 “Que la marche de Newton dans sa découverte de la gravitation universelle a été exactement
la même que dans celle de la formule de binome” (passage quoted by Stewart in Elements of the Philosophy
of the Human Mind, in The Collected Works, vol. III, p. 319). Laplace’s astronomy and mathematics were
discussed by John Playfair in his review of the Traité de mécanique céleste, published in the “Edinburgh
Review” in 1808. On the spread of Laplace’s ideas in Scotland see N. GUICCIARDINI, The Development of
Newtonian Calculus in Britain, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989, pp. 95-107.
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phers aim to extend general laws. Stewart did not mean that physical facts can
change suddenly and deviate from their ordinary course – he truly believed
that nature is immutable – but, like Reid, Stewart insisted that God may
change the course of nature. In fact, as the natural order derives from God, it
is logically possible to conceive that nature will alter its laws precisely because
they are not necessary, but contingently set by God. In contrast, mathemati-
cal truths are universal and necessary, since any exceptions imply a logical
contradiction24. 
Diverging from this belief, Shepherd thought that mathematical reason-
ing and physical induction share the same axioms and are both based on the
principle 
that, when objects are formed the same upon one occasion as another, their qualities,
properties, and effects, will be similar. It is this proposition on which mathematical
demonstration, and physical induction equally, and only, rest for their truth. There
is no difference; objects are what their formations render them, whether in the
shape of mathematical diagrams, or other aggregates in nature.25
The strong affinity between mathematics and natural philosophy reveals
that Shepherd did not agree on the Baconian definition of induction as the
collection of observable facts and the generalization of their common prop-
erties. She rather thought of induction as the extension of knowledge through
mathematical tools. This account could have been suggested by the mathe-
matician Charles Babbage, Shepherd’s personal friend and correspondent
since 1823. In a paper on induction, Babbage contrasted the old Baconian
account with the new mathematical interpretation:
The term induction when employed in mathematics is not to be understood in pre-
cisely the same acceptation as it is used by the followers of Bacon; in enquiries in
natural philosophy it implies the detection of the physical cause of some phenom-
ena by examining where it is attended with different circumstances, those which are
not concerned in inducing the effect are gradually excluded and the efficient cause
becomes apparent. [...] 
In mathematical enquiries the method of induction is said to be made use of when
by examining a few particular cases of a theorem we conclude the truth of some gen-
eral law.26
Induction is here meant as a means of scientific discovery. While Bacon
chiefly understood induction as knowledge of the world achieved a posteriori,
through the direct observation of phenomena, Babbage used induction to
24 STEWART, Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind, pp. 318-321.
25 SHEPHERD, Mathematical demonstration, p. 279.
26 C. BABBAGE, Of Induction, British Library, Add. 37202, p. 56.
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expand our knowledge of the world to spheres and cases that would remain
unnoticed. Thus, the role played by mathematics was not only to formalize
the knowledge gained through observation and experiment, but also the dis-
covery of new applications of scientific laws. 
Mathematical induction could not deal with contingent truths: its
results should be as necessary as any other product of mathematical reason-
ing. Therefore, to understand causality in mathematical terms seemed to
restore the necessity of causal relations, despite the sceptical doubts Hume
had raised. 
3. Causality and time 
Shepherd’s mathematical view of causality had other important implica-
tions. Firstly, Shepherd affirms, unlike Hume, that the notion of causality is
not provided by the experience of several similar cases, but the observation of
a single case affords proof of the necessary connection between cause and
effect:
Long observation of the invariableness of antecedency, and subsequency, is not
wanted; many trials are not wanted, to generate the notion of producing power. 
One trial is enough, in such circumstances, as will bring the mind to the following
reasoning. 
Here is a new quality, which appears to my senses: But it could not arise of itself;
nor could any surrounding objects, but one (or more) effect it; therefore that one
(or more) have occasioned it, for there is nothing else to make a difference; and a
difference could not “begin of itself ”.27
Shepherd was evidently criticizing Hume on custom as the origin of the
notion of cause; her emphasis on the possibility of inferring causality from a
single case also aimed to show that the collection of various cases is not a
threat to our established beliefs about causality. In fact, while Hume consid-
ered future events capable of contradicting our expectations and proving
them to be wrong, Shepherd thought that future events do not contradict
causal inferences, as similar causes could not be supposed to produce differ-
ent effects in the future and unexpected effects can result only from different,
yet unknown causes: the possibility to conceive that causes will not produce
their effects does not prove that causation is not a necessary connection. On
the contrary, it proves merely that our knowledge is still inaccurate and we
have failed to understand correctly the true necessary connections among
events. According to Shepherd, Hume’s mental experiment on the possible
27 SHEPHERD, Mathematical demonstration, pp. 43-44.
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loose occurrence of causes and effects shows that a different combination of
causes may prevent the production of the effect, but it cannot be inferred that
causes and effects are not necessarily conjoined. 
Secondly, according to Shepherd, time is not the key element in our
notion of causality: effects are not the events appearing after their cause, but
depend on causes for their existence. Shepherd suggests that causes and
effects should be seen as synchronous events, as the effects result from quali-
ties still existing after the production of the effect: 
The objects whose union is necessary to a given result, must certainly exist,
antecedent to such an union. But it is in their UNION, there exists those newly
formed objects, or masses of qualities called Effects, which are therefore identical
with the similar cause; for in this union, Cause and Effect are synchronous, and they
are but different words for the same Essence. Fire and wood must be antecedent to
combustion, no doubt; but in the union of Fire and Wood, there exists immediate-
ly combustion as a new event in nature; also in this union exists the similar cause
allowed by the data, whilst combustion is also termed the Effect of the union of Fire
and Wood.28
Shepherd thought of cause as a combination of material qualities, while
Hume often defined it as an event preceding the effect. Hume’s emblematic
example of causality was the black billiard ball striking the white one. The
motion of the two balls are here distinct events; when the second ball begins
its motion, the first one is at rest and it is hard to say that cause and effect are
synchronous. On the contrary, Shepherd mostly offered examples borrowed
from chemistry, suggesting that effects depend on the continuous action of
the cause: 
It becomes therefore part of the definition of fire to burn certain bodies, to melt
others; of bread to nourish the human body; of snow to be cold, and white; and
these qualities they must have, in order to compose that entire enumeration of qual-
ities, for which appropriate names have been formed, and to the exhibition of which
similar and efficient causes have been in action.29
Therefore, the productive qualities (or chemical properties) need to per-
form their power for the whole time the effect exists: the constant priority of
the cause is a somewhat misleading criterion, as the disappearance of the
cause also produces the cessation of the effect. 
28 Ivi, p. 57.
29 Ivi, p. 55.
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4. Conclusion: Shepherd and Victorian science 
Shepherd’s daughter reported that her mother’s philosophy was praised
by Charles Lyell who defined her an unanswerable logician, and by William
Whewell who used one of her works as a textbook at Cambridge. Moreover,
Shepherd’s philosophy was mentioned in Robert Blakey’s History of the
Philosophy of the Mind – an extensive catalogue of the theories of knowledge
from Greek philosophy to the nineteenth century – and Samuel Taylor
Coleridge too praised Shepherd’s metaphysics in one of his notebooks30.
These sympathetic reactions are slightly surprising, as Shepherd cannot
be easily placed within the mainstream of Positivist science. In fact, she
forcibly denied that physical causality is just a uniform correlation of events,
and her causal realism does not seem to be supported or shared by nine-
teenth-century scientists who felt themselves more comfortable with the less
ambitious definition of causality as a temporal relationship.
Shepherd’s reading of Hume failed to catch the most valuable and long
lasting contribution of Hume’s philosophy to Positivist science, the warning
against searching for the active powers of nature. As Richard Olson famous-
ly affirmed, nineteenth-century science was deeply indebted to the reading of
Hume given by common-sense philosophers: Hume discovered the account
of causality today known as the regularity view; in spite of his irreligious con-
clusions, his account of causality was accepted, insofar as it provided a fruit-
ful and reliable understanding of physical causation31. Diverging from the
standard view, Shepherd did not acknowledge that physical causality is a tem-
poral correlation of events and therefore did not share the admiration for
Hume as its discoverer.
However, Mary Shepherd was not completely extraneous to Victorian
science and Whewell’s praise may help to understand her role in nineteenth-
century philosophy. Whewell notably tried to introduce Kantian philosophy
at Cambridge and Shepherd’s books were perhaps not the best means to
achieve this goal. There are striking differences between Shepherd and Kant
on causality: the most obvious is that Shepherd thought that causes are real
powers within objects, while Kant affirmed that causality is a mental law
applied to empirical knowledge. Nevertheless, Shepherd reaffirmed the role
of reason in understanding causal connections and reintroduced strong,
mathematical necessity in causal reasoning. Without mentioning Shepherd,
30 R. BLAKEY, History of the Philosophy of the Mind, 4 vols, London, Saunders, 1848, vol. IV, pp. 39-46
and S.T. COLERIDGE, Notebook Q, in The Notebooks of Samuel Taylor Coleridge. Volume 5 : 182 7-183 4, 
ed. by K. Coburn, A.J. Harding, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2002, p. 981.
31 R. OLSON, Scottish Philosophy and British Physics. 175 0-1880, Princeton, Princeton University
Press, 1975.
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Whewell wrote that custom, belief, or instinct should be rejected as sources
of our notion of causality given that
The relation of cause and effect, being of the same kind as the necessary relations of
figure and number, is not properly spoken of as established in our minds by a spe-
cial law of our constitution: for we reject that loose and inappropriate phraseology
which speaks of the relations of figure and number as “determined by the laws of
belief ”.32
Whewell could have borrowed from Shepherd the assumption that causal
necessity is akin to mathematical necessity. This clear comparison gave to
Whewell further arguments to deny that causality is based on non-rational ele-
ments and allowed him to turn more resolutely to Kant’s rationalism.
Moreover, Shepherd’s philosophy also had other important consequences: her
mathematical view of causality contributed to rejecting Hume’s distinction
between the demonstrative evidence – proper to mathematics – and the prob-
able conclusions attained in the physical and practical sciences. Shepherd
sought to prove that Hume’s choice to give a peculiar epistemological status to
mathematics – the science dealing with relation of ideas alone – actually ranked
physics as a less certain science. On the contrary, Shepherd and nineteenth-cen-
tury readers of Hume endeavoured to give physics the same degree of certainty
attributed to mathematics. To restore necessary connection was one of the pos-
sible ways – perhaps also the most controversial – to pursue this goal. 
I am grateful to Stephen Buckle, Peter Kail, Luigi Turco, and the participants to
the Humean Readings 10 for their insightful comments on a earlier version of this paper.
32 W. WHEWELL, The Philosophy of Inductive Sciences, 2 vols, London, Partner, 1847, vol. I, p. 175.
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